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Abstract
The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is the rank of the matrix A + B. We give a
construction of rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria, which answers an
open problem by Kannan and Theobald (2010).
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Finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is a PPAD-complete problem (Chen and
Deng, 2006). For that reason, classes of bimatrix games where a Nash equilibrium can be
found more easily are of some interest. An equilibrium of a zero-sum game (A,B) where
A+B is the all-zero matrix can be found in polynomial time by solving a linear program.
As a generalization, Kannan and Theobald (2010) defined the rank of a bimatrix game
(A,B) as the rank of the matrix A+B, and give a polynomial-time algorithm to find an
approximate equilibrium of a game of fixed rank. They asked (Open Problem 9) if a rank-
1 game may possibly have only a polynomial number of Nash equilibria. This is not the
case, according to the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let p > 2 and let (A,B) be the n×n bimatrix game with entries of A
ai j =


2pi+ j if j > i
p2i if j = i
0 if j < i
(1)
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and B = A⊤. Then A+B is of rank 1, and (A,B) is a nondegenerate
bimatrix game with 2n−1 many Nash equilibria.
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Proof. By (1), A + B = αβ⊤ with the n components of the column vectors α and β
defined by αi = pi and β j = 2p j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, so A+B is of rank 1.
Let y be any mixed strategy of the column player and let S be the support of y, that
is, S = { j | y j > 0}. Consider any row i and let T = { j ∈ S | j > i}. Then, because A is
upper triangular, the expected payoff against y in row i is
(Ay)i = aiiyi + ∑
j∈T
ai jy j . (2)
Suppose i 6∈ S. If T is empty, then (Ay)i = 0 < (Ay)1, otherwise let t = minT and note that
for j ∈ T we have ai j = 2pi+ j < p1+i+ j ≤ pt+ j ≤ at j, so (Ay)i < (Ay)t . Hence, no row i
outside S is a best response to y. Similary, because the game is symmetric, any column
that is a best response to a strategy x of the row player belongs to the support of x. So no
mixed strategy has more pure best responses than the size of its support, that is, the game
is nondegenerate (von Stengel, 2002). Moreover, if (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B),
then x and y have equal supports.
For any nonempty subset S of {1, . . . ,n}, we construct a mixed strategy y with sup-
port S so that (y,y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B). This implies that the game has 2n−1
many Nash equilibria, one for each support set S. The equilibrium condition holds if
(Ay)i = u for i ∈ S with equilibrium payoff u, because then (Ay)i < u for i 6∈ S as shown
above. We start with s = maxS, where (Ay)s = assys = u, by fixing u as some positive
constant (e.g., u = 1), which determines ys. Once yi is known for all i ∈ S (and yi = 0
for i 6∈ S), we scale y and u by multiplication with 1/∑i∈S yi so that y becomes a mixed
strategy. Assume that i∈ S and T = { j ∈ S | j > i} 6= /0 and assume that yk has been found
for all k in T so that (Ay)k = u for all k in T , which is true for T = {s}. Then, as shown
above, ∑ j∈T ai jy j < ∑ j∈T at jy j = (Ay)t = u for t =minT , so yi is determined by (Ay)i = u
in (2), and yi > 0. By induction, this determines yi for all i in S, and after re-scaling gives
the desired equilibrium strategy y.
Adsul, Garg, Mehta, and Sohoni (2011) showed how to find in polynomial time an
exact Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game, which is of the form (A,−A+ αβ⊤) with
suitable column vectors α ∈Rm and β ∈Rn. They proved that a mixed strategy pair (x,y)
is a Nash equilibrium of this game if and only if for some suitable real λ the equation
x⊤α = λ holds and (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A,−A+ 1λβ⊤), where 1
is the all-one vector; this equilibrium can be found as the solution to a linear program
parameterized by λ . Their algorithm uses binary search for λ combined with solving the
parameterized LP.
The exponential number of Nash equilibria of the game in Theorem 1 shows that the
path that follows the solutions of the parameterized LP with parameter λ has an exponen-
tial number of intersections with the hyperplane defined by x⊤α = λ . Hence, that path
has exponentially many line segments. Murty (1980) describes a parameterized LP with
such an exponentially long path of length 2n. His LP is of the form
maximize c⊤z subject to Az ≥ b+1λ , z ≥ 0 (3)
with A as in (1) with p = 1, and the vectors c and b in Rn given by c j = 4n− j and
bi = −2n−i for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. The payoffs for the game in Theorem 1 have been inspired
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by Murty’s example, but are not systematically constructed from it; at the point of this
writing, it is not even clear how to get a game with that many equilibria from Murty’s
result.
For specific instances of the game in Theorem 1 one can choose p = 3 or p = 4 in
(1) and divide all payoffs by p2 (or let the rows and columns be numbered from 0 to n−1
rather than 1 to n). In the construction of mixed strategies y with support S described in the
proof, starting with u = ps then gives integer values for yi for i ∈ S which are afterwards
re-scaled. Verifying the equilibria of these games was aided by the webpage of Savani
(2012).
The number of 2n − 1 Nash equilibria of an n× n bimatrix game is large, the same
as that of the coordination game where both players have the identity matrix (which has
maximal rank). Quint and Shubik (1997) even conjectured this to be the maximum possi-
ble number (always considering nondegenerate games), which is true for n ≤ 4 (Keiding,
1997; McLennan and Park, 1999). However, this conjecture was refuted by von Stengel
(1999) who constructed a 6×6 game with 75 equilibria, and more generally n×n games
with asymptotically more than 2.4n equilibria. Quint and Shubik (2002) showed that a
game (A,A) where both players have identical payoffs has at most 2n − 1 equilibria. A
symmetric game (A,A⊤) of size n× n, as considered in Theorem 1, has at most 2n − 1
symmetric equilibria, because an equilibrium is uniquely determined by the pair of sup-
ports for the two strategies. However, the number of possibly nonsymmetric equilibria of
a symmetric game is not bounded by 2n −1, as the following simple argument based on
a standard symmetrization shows. Suppose (A,B) is an n×n bimatrix game with positive
payoff matrices and more than 2n equilibria, and let C =
(
0 A
B⊤ 0
)
. Then for any pair
of equilibria (x,y), (x′,y′) of (A,B), one obtains an equilibrium ((xˆ, yˆ′),(xˆ′, yˆ)) of (C,C⊤)
where xˆ, xˆ′, yˆ, and yˆ′ are scaled versions of x, x′, y, and y′, respectively, so that the respec-
tive optimal payoffs of Ayˆ and B⊤xˆ′ coincide, and similarly those of B⊤xˆ and Ayˆ′. Then
(C,C⊤) is of size 2n×2n and has more than (2n)2 many equilibria, as claimed.
Hence, it is an open question if there are nondegenerate n×n games of rank 1 with
more than 2n many Nash equilibria.
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